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Fiscal Devolution and Dependency 
 
James Foreman-Peck§ and Laurian Lungu  
Aberconway  Building, Colum Drive, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff, CF10 3EU, UK 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Public spending devolution in practice is widely seen as more appropriate for addressing varied 
political aspirations within state boundaries than is  tax devolution. A drawback is that devolved public 
spending may be subject to irresistible upward pressure, as illustrated by ‘formula drift’ of the United 
Kingdom devolved administrations. By crowding out the private sector such public spending can 
exacerbate the problem it was originally intended to alleviate.  When taxpayers do not value increases in 
government output at least as highly as the private goods and services they must forgo to finance them, 
then the public sector is too large. This paper estimates a three sector Hecksher-Ohlin model of the 
economy with the greatest relative rise of the public spending ratio in the United Kingdom, Wales. 
Simulation of the model shows a net gain in emp loyment from a one percent cut in income tax matched 
by a corresponding reduction in government spending. This result is consistent with the current level of 
intergovernmental transfers being excessive.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Devolution of public spending may permit local governments to provide public 
services better adapted to local preferences than their central counterparts (Tiebout  
1956; Besley and Coates 1999). They are closer to their residents and information 
dissipates with distance. Within a given budget possibly they can alter the composition, 
or change the method of delivery. A second, not exclusive, justification for devolution 
can be a local predilection for devolved government quite regardless of whether it is 
more responsive or generally better at meeting local needs. People may prefer to be 
governed by those with whom they identify, independently of the quality of 
governance1.  
 
If expenditure is devolved there is an incentive case that at least some portion of 
taxes should be also (Sanguinetti and Tommasi, 2004). In practice, while the sub-
national government share of public spending has increased in a majority of OECD 
countries, the share in general government revenues (excluding grants) has failed to rise 
correspondingly and has even declined in several cases (Journard and Kongsrud 2003). 
Some institutional arrangements may encourage this trend more than others. An 
example is where an expenditure ministry bargains on behalf of regional authorities for 
finance with a ministry that raises national revenue and provides for national level 
public goods. In this case a regime in which the spending ministry gets political benefits 
from the expenditure will generate more spending than one where taxes, as well as 
spending, are devolved (Sato 2002).  
 
                                                                 
1 One part of this  condition apparently is satisfied for Wales and Scotland according to the ‘British 
Identity’ MORI poll for the Economist in November 1999. The Welsh and Scottish have a stronger 
identification with Wales and Scotland than with Britain, in marked contrast to residents in England. 
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On the other hand stabilisation and redistribution weaken the case for tax 
devolution. When taxes are not devolved and a region experiences a negative demand 
shock, tax receipts fall and unemployment pay outs increase, boosting government 
spending and partly offsetting the private sector contraction. This is a form of risk 
sharing between regions subject to different shocks (Persson and Tabellini 1996). 
Hughes Hallett (2005) undercuts the normative risk sharing argument by showing that 
fiscal autonomy for UK regions would reduce volatility of output and inflation2. 
Interpersonal redistribution also may be reflected in inter-regional net subsidies (Melitz 
and Zummer 2002; Decressin 2002). Tax competition from other jurisdictions anyway 
limits the extent to which taxation can effectively be devolved. The extent of factor 
mobility between fiscally devolved administrations is the principal constraint (Wildasin 
2003).  
 
Without  devolved taxation, income smoothing by the federal or central 
government spending, rather than by built- in tax stabilisers, can give rise to higher 
centrally funded state spending long after negative shocks have dispersed, preventing 
adjustment (Obstfeld and Peri 1998). Stabilisation presupposes some recovery from 
shocks and redistribution similarly has no reason to be trended. Soft budget constraints 
and over-spending biases embedded in political institutions exacerbate a tendency 
towards upwards drift in devolved public expenditure (Pisauro 2001).  
 
The present paper therefore examines the fiscal performance of the devolved 
administrations of the UK to assess evidence of such dependency. A test is constructed 
and a tax and government spending model of the most likely candidate administration is 
simulated. The employment patterns found are inconsistent with long run regional 
                                                                 
2 Unless all shocks are on the supply side. 
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balance of payments equilibrium, suggesting an advantage from balanced reductions in 
taxation matched by government spending. 
 
2. The Devolved Economy 
The model of the devolved ‘branch plant’ economy is developed from Minford 
et al. (1994), and Hecksher-Ohlin–Samuleson principles. It consists of two private 
sectors, producing respectively traded goods (YT), all of which are exported, and non-
traded goods (YNT), and a public sector. The private sectors employ intensively 
unskilled labour (LT) in the traded good production and skilled labour (LNT) in activities 
that do not trade across the boundaries. Unskilled labour is immobile across borders but 
possibly mobile between sectors. Skilled labour is mobile across borders, so that the 
non-traded wage in the devolved administration equals that of the larger economy,  
*
NTNT WW = .  
 
 Labour markets are competitive; employers’ real wage costs equal the marginal 
product of labour in both traded and non-traded sectors: 
)()1( ' TTTEMP LFPWT =+  and, 
)()1( ' NTNTNTEMP LGPWT =+  
where F(.) and G(.) are production functions of traded and non-traded goods and 
services respectively and EMPT  is the employment tax rate. The traded product 
price, TP is determined in the world market with 
*
TT PP = . Non-traded goods and 
services prices )( NTP can diverge from those in other areas but must remain linked to 
NTW by production technology. Thus, the real exchange rate is: 
TNT PPe =  
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With mobility between sectors both WT  and NTW  are exogenous; consequently 
the real exchange rate is also. More productive local labour appreciates the exchange 
rate. Labour supplies depend upon the cost of living, an index of the two prices, TP  and 
NTP , and on the income tax rate, YT .   
Without tax autonomy devolved government spend ing (G) is fixed regardless of 
tax receipts.   
BYG G +=  
The expenditure consists of purchases of goods and services to produce output 
(YG) of public administration, health and/or education, say, plus transfer payments (B). 
Both create a demand for non-traded goods and services, as does traded good 
production. YG requires labour for production,  
LT  = gT(YG),   LN = gN(YG) 
The government sector can employ workers from either non-traded or traded 
sectors. The expectation is that mobile labour will be used more intensively than 
immobile labour.  
 
The demand for nontraded output depends upon traded output and government 
spending. Employees in exporting or in government service spend money in shops and 
on local services and send their children to school. In turn this gives rise to other rounds 
of spending. An income tax effect depends upon the levels of traded output and 
government spending and their respective nontraded goods multipliers, on the demand 
side. On the supply side the level of income tax affects labour force participation and 
therefore private sector output. Government production, by contrast with transfer 
payments, competes with the private sector for resources. 
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Net finance comes from the federal or central government. Tax receipts (t ) are 
paid directly to the central government. They increase with employment, wage levels  
and tax rates. The region’s current account is then: 
YT  (e) - M(e) = G - T 
where YT   are exports and M, imports, all tradable consumption. A net subsidy 
to the economy (NTR) (T<G) allows a current account deficit and a higher level of 
demand at a given real exchange rate.  
 
Federal or central government income smoothing in the response to a negative 
shock to exports and thus to employment and income occurs because T falls (by less 
than X) and G remains unchanged (or may in fact rise). The regional balance of trade 
deficit widens and tax revenue no longer covers as much of the cost of government 
output and employment, so there is an expansion of the subsidy. The share of 
government output and employment in the total rises.  
[ insert Figure 1 here ] 
Figure 1 shows the case of mobility between traded and nontraded sectors, 
where the real exchange rate is determined by technical efficiency and therefore is 
exogenous. If net intergovernmental transfers pay for interpersonal transfers such as 
pensions and invalidity benefit then they simply boost consumption, allowing demand 
to exceed output by the amount of the transfer. They also permit more (tradable  
consumption) imports than (tradable production) exports.  
 
Again, when some of the net transfer pays for government production and 
therefore employs local labour, some of which would have worked in the private sector, 
the capacity to import is still enhanced by the block grant from the central government, 
regardless of whether those in the devolved jurisdiction value the output as much as in 
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the first case. However the capacity to export will be reduced insofar as local labour is 
diverted from the tradable sector. Hence the balance of payments constraint may not be 
shifted as much as by pure transfers. The willingness of consumers to substitute 
government output for tradable consumption (imports) determines the level of demand 
generated by the block grant. 
 
Now consider an increment of government spending not paid for by inter-
governmental transfers. Assume that the extra government output is judged an 
inadequate substitute for private goods forgone as a consequence of the extra taxes paid 
in the devolved administration3. Extra taxes and government output reduce private 
sector output (tradable and non-tradable) at a given real exchange rate. Exports are cut  
by the transfer of labour from the private to the public sector. Private consumption and 
therefore imports do not fall initially despite the higher taxes because the taxes pay for 
the workforce transferred to the public sector. These people still wish to consume 
tradables, so that imports are not reduced. The economy therefore deflates as a 
consequence of the self- financed increment in government spending, unless more 
intergovernmental transfers are forthcoming; since the real exchange rate cannot adjust, 
monetary forces exert downward pressure on income, employment and output to restore 
balance of payments equilibrium (PCA shifts left in figure 1)4. Hence government 
expansion crowds out the private sector and deflates the economy when government 
output is not valued sufficiently highly by taxpayers. 
 
The solution in such cases is to increase the size of the tradable sector by supply 
side policies such as tax cuts matched by public spending cuts. The expansion of the 
                                                                 
3 If increments to what the government was doing were useless in utility terms they would still record a 
contribution to output because of the way output is measured 
4 PCA , primary current account, balance is the series of output and real exchange rate combinations at 
which exports equal imports. A given output and real exchange rate determines the demand for imports. If 
the supply of exports contracts then  PCA balance shifts left. 
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private sector creates more exports, and shifts the PCA balance to the right, permitting 
more long term output, employment and income. Failure to take into account the 
monetary forces set in motion by balance of payments adjustment can conceal the 
asymmetric effects of government expenditure increase and tax cuts on the level of 
economic activity in devolved administrations and economies.  
 
This devolved government over-expansion possibility can be tested. In practice 
government output is measured at cost, and so, in an exercise implicitly to assess the 
value users place on government output, must be ignored. Employment is a better 
welfare proxy. If tax cuts boost employment by more than the equivalent government  
spending reduction then the balance of payments will be improved, demand and output 
will be higher. The balance of advantage indicates the valuation of incremental 
government output. 
 
3. The Devolved Administrations of the United Kingdom 
The UK devolved administrations exercise no tax-raising powers but are 
primarily funded with block grants from the central government that levies taxes. By 
contrast the English regions lack authority for devolved spending, as well as for levying 
taxes. Taxes are typically proportional or progressive (in the UK with the exception of 
the only local tax, the community charge that accounts for a small proportion of total 
tax payments). They therefore permit contributions to the finance of services such as 
heath and education to a common standard according to ability to pay by individual and 
by jurisdictions. These tax arrangements mean that, unlike central government, there are 
no electoral advantages for administrations in terms of tax restraint from public 
spending economy.  
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Since 1979 the size of the block grant has supposedly been governed by the 
Barnett formula, intended virtually to eliminate the spending per head gap with England 
in the very long term. The grant per head of the devolved population increases in 
absolute terms with spending per head in England. Since the administrations spend 
more per head than England, their percentage increases in budgets would be less under 
the formula. However political bargaining, ‘formula bypass’ (Heald 1994; 2003), 
ensured that the spending gap is more likely to increase than to diminish5. A study of 
Scottish education spending found that using the English Local Authority approach to 
assessing ‘need’, Scottish pupils would receive about 3 percent more than the English – 
but actual spending is considerably higher (King, Pashley and Ball 2004). 
 
With lower regional incomes the same spending gives rise to a higher ratio of 
public expenditure to GDP; a region with a 20 percent lower than average income per 
head would exhibit a ratio of 1.25 if this principle were followed. While temporarily 
higher ratios might be warranted in response to shocks, permanently higher real 
government spending, taking the ratio above the warranted level would be a symptom 
of inefficiency, or of ‘gold-plating’ relative to rest of the economy, unless the spending 
ratio in other regions has risen similarly. Stabilisation presupposes some recovery from 
shocks and redistribution similarly has no reason to be trended. Trends in devolved 
government spending to income ratios could reflect federal or central government 
decisions rather than increasing or decreasing dependency. Therefore a test of 
dependency or inefficiency is whether there is a trend rise in the ratio of government 
spending to GDP in the devolved administrations relative to the ratio in the core, or to 
the federal average. 
 
                                                                 
5 For Scotland, Midwinter (2002 108) points out that the Scottish Executive was able to accommodate 
free personal care for elderly and teachers’ pay increases within Treasury allocated expenditure growth 
totals, because its share of the UK budget was rising- despite the Barnett ‘squeeze’.  
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As Table 1 shows, the ratio of government spending to output (in per capita 
term) in Wales and Scotland has risen relative to England  since 1976. The ratio is 
highest for Northern Ireland, where it has been fluctuating around 1.8 since 1976, 
despite the narrowing of the income gap over the period. England’s poorest region, the 
North East with approximately the same income per capita as Wales, showed a slightly 
higher government spending ratio than Wales in 2001, though lower in earlier years.  
Wales exhibits the strongest trend increase in ratio since 1976, albeit from a low level. 
Relative to England, the government spending to output ratio has risen from 1.2 in 1976 
to 1.54 in 2000. Wales is therefore the most suitable candidate for testing the 
consequences of rising central government dependency in a devolved administration.  
[ insert Table 1 here ] 
 
4. Model Specification 
To operationalise the model of section 3 a CES function is assumed for traded 
production and Cobb-Douglas technology for the private non-traded sector. There is a 
perfectly elastic capital supply at the world price, the rental ‘r’.  It follows that the gross 
wage or unit labour costs for traded sector must also be fixed- so that traded sector 
employment is then determined by the supply of labour to this sector. Employment fixes 
traded sector output and this determines non-traded sector output by creating the 
demand for it.  
 
Suppressing subscripts the CRS CES manufacturing production function is:  
[ ] rrr ddg /1)1( --- -+= TT LKY        (4.1) 
with capital and labour having relative factor shares d (0<d<1). The parameter g 
measures the state of technology (g>0) and denotes the efficiency of production. The 
elasticity of substitution is s=1/1+r with -1<?. 
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The determinants of the exogenous traded sector wage TW , can be inferred by 
substituting for capital in the production function with the marginal productivity 
condition:  
( ) )1(// rrg +-= KYdPr TT         (4.2) 
( ) ( )[ ] [ ])1(//11/ )1()1()1( dgdg rrsdsrsrr --+= ----+ TTT PrLY     (4.3) 
Output per worker, TT LY , is fixed by the production function and the world price of 
capital. Cost minimisation determines the gross cost of labour must equal the marginal 
revenue productivity of labour. Then: 
( ) )1(/)1(/)1( rrgd +--=+ TTTEMPT LYPTW       (4.4) 
Substituting for ( ) )1(/ r+TT LY  from equation (4.3) into (4.4), real gross labour costs in 
the traded sector become: 
( )[ ]rsdsrsrr dggd TTEMPT PrPTW /1)1(/)1( )1()1( ---- -+-=+    (4.5) 
 
The lower the elasticity of substitution ( s<1) the smaller is the (inverse) change 
in the traded sector wage caused by a given change in the capital rental. When the 
elasticity of substitution is greater than unity, a reduction in the rental also reduces the 
wage, because the substitution effect dominates the output effect. If productivity g is 
lower in the devolved administration’s economy than in the core economy then so will 
be the regional traded good wage. Otherwise, with a similar capital rental and traded 
good price, it will be the same. 
 
Non-traded sector output NTY depends upon aggregate demand (DMD) from the 
traded or export sector (YT) plus components financed by government (G) net of taxes.  
( )TNTNT PPDMDY /0 fba ++=        (4
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and aggregate demand is determined as follows; 
)]1([]1)(1([ 3)21 yTEMPy TYTTGDMD -+--+= bbb      (4.7) 
where fba ,3,0,, =jj  are parameters 
 
The representative agent consumes a bundle of traded and non-traded goods for 
which a price P  is paid, taken as a weighted ave rage of the traded and non-traded price  
indexes. Each agent is endowed with a fixed amount of time, which is spent either on 
leisure. The labour supply to the traded sector is derived from on household utility 
maximisation, where the after-tax real wage relative to unemployment benefits 
determines the trade-off between work and leisure.  
 
Employment in the traded sector is fixed by exogenous gross wage and the 
supply of labour to the sector. Output is then determined by the marginal productivity of 
labour. In logs the marginal productivity equation is: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]TPtwLnLnLYLn /)11/1)1)/( +++-= rgd r     (4.8) 
Thus, average traded sector productivity depends on the real wages and the state of 
technology.  
 
The demand for employment in non-traded sector is derived from the demand 
for output. The supply of nontraded labour depends upon opportunities outside the 
economy and the size of the economy’s workforce. The demand for non-traded labour 
in logs is (CES): 
[ ] )ln(/)1(lnln)( 321 NTNTEMPNTNT YPTWEMPLn JJJ ++-=     (4.9) 
where 31, -=iiJ  are parameters. The real wage of non-traded labour can be forced up 
relative to the traded wage if there is imperfect mobility between the sectors. If 
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government demand is primarily for skilled labour then is this will be the principal 
determinant of the relative wage: 6         
)ln()ln()ln()ln( 54 TNT WGW ++= JJ      (4.10) 
Working population depends upon natural increase, net migration and influences 
upon labour force participation such as administrative regimes for sickness benefit. 
Only skilled labour migrates across the border in the present model. Net migration is 
often supposed to depend upon relative wages and or relative unemployment rates (for 
example Jackman and Savouri 1992). The impact of public sector employment (public 
administration, health, education) depends on whether the appointments are from the 
immobile or mobile labour forces. The effect is captured by the coefficient on 
government employment in the working population equation.  
 
Unemployment is determined by the difference between working population and 
total employment, both public and private sector. Thus, unemployment is not the gap 
between labour supply and demand, it is rather the excess of the labour force over the 
labour supply7.  Migration may alter the size of the labour force which in turn will affect 
unemployment. 
 
5. Model Estimation  
The above model, estimated for the economy of Wales from annual data 
between 1971 and 2001, is set out in Table 2 below. Manufacturing industry is the 
proxy for the traded goods sector8. Appendix 1 presents unit root ADF tests for the 
                                                                 
6 This is a mark-up on manufacturing (traded) sector wages since the traded sector wage is exogenous.  
7 For a discussion on the implications of the two models of unemployment determination see, for 
instance, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). 
8 The correspondence with the theoretical sectors is not exact since there is some traded output produced 
in the non-manufacturing sector (for example mining at the beginning of the period and tourism at the 
end. Historically coal exports have been of major significance for the Welsh economy. On the one hand 
relatively little employment  and output (11 percent in the Industrial Production  index of 1970) was 
accounted for by mining even at the beginning of the period. On the other, it was more erratic than 
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variables. The maintained regressions for I(1) included either an intercept and a 
deterministic trend or an intercept only, as appropriate. The tests show that the unit root 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level for all variables. The data 
series and definitions are described in Appendix 2. All model equations have been 
estimated by instrumental variables (IV), using various exogenous variables of the 
model as instruments9. Appendix 3 presents the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for the residuals 
for model equations.  
 
Equation (A1.1), the manufacturing labour supply function, should ideally 
measure labour supply in hours, rather than in persons, the actual specification. In view 
of the rise in part-time, primarily female employment and the absence of data either on 
hours worked or on the proportion of part-time workers in Welsh manufacturing, the 
ratio of female employees in Welsh working population (FWPOP) is included to control 
for this change. Demographic shifts and other time-dependent factors are approximated 
by a time trend. 
[ insert Table 2 here ] 
The estimated productivity equation (A1.2) is derived from the labour marginal 
productivity equation (4.8). The effect of tax-adjusted wages relative to manufacturing 
prices on manufacturing output is statistically significant. Also highly significant is the 
lagged productivity term, the coefficient of which implies a strong persistence of 
productivity effects. As part-time workers displaced full time workers, manufacturing 
labour productivity measured simply as a ratio of manufacturing output to the number 
of employees in manufacturing could be misleading.10 As in equation A1.1 the spread of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
manufacturing- employment and output fell earlier (between 1971 and 1974 output declined 40 percent). 
So there is an overstatement of buoyancy of export sector in the early years. 
9 It is well known that the OLS estimation of equations with lagged dependent variables, as some 
equations in our model are, renders the DW statistics unreliable.   
10 Explaining productivity in UK manufacturing as a whole has proved problematic, partly because 
apparent productivity slowdown in the 1970s stemmed from incorrect measurement of output and from 
structural change (Cameron, 2000). 
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female employment is therefore introduced as a control.  The negative coefficient 
estimated for the ratio of female employees in working population (FWPOP) is 
consistent with this interpretation. 
 
Turning to the non-traded sector, equation (A1.3) explains the demand for 
output with the two exogenous components of demand, traded output and government 
spending. The size of the long run coefficient on traded output/manufacturing reflects 
the declining share of output of this sector over the estimation period. Firms’ demand 
for labour to produce non-traded output is given by a Cobb-Douglas marginal 
productivity equation (A1.4). The long run equilibrium ensures that this exhibits 
constant returns to scale. Equation (A1.5) models the real net non-traded wage as a 
mark-up over real traded wage. The coefficient of government spending is positive but  
small, consistent with government demand for labour pushing up wages of selected 
categories of employees.  
 
Equation (A1.6) explains working population. House prices determine the 
migrant component of working population; higher relative house prices elsewhere 
discourage migration from Wales but encourage migration to Wales. The net effect on 
migration may well depend on the region, whether it is a net importer or net exporter of 
people to or from Wales. Those relative house price terms included are proxies for the 
whole regional pattern of house price change. Adding in other region house prices does 
not change the overall impact, even though they are often statistically significant.   
 
The inclusion of numbers on invalidity and sickness benefits (SIB) in the 
equation is designed to test whether working population is reduced by the high claimant 
rate. The coefficient indeed has a negative sign; in view of the relative sizes of the two 
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groups, the elasticity of 0.04 implies that, at the end of the period, for every four 
entering or leaving receipt of invalidity benefit approximately one person entered or left 
the working population. Current declines in numbers on benefits are therefore explained 
by moves into retirement; the majority of male claimants are over 55 years of age. Most 
net new claimants apparently would have not been part of the workforce if they had not 
claimed invalidity benefit.  
 
The public sector and non-traded employment variables in the equation capture 
similar, but larger, displacement effects. In 2001 public sector employment was 27 
percent of working population, which together with the elasticity of 0.258, suggests a 
one for one relationship; increases in public sector employment have raised the working 
population equivalently, either by greater labour force participation or by migration 
(which includes preventing emigration).  Private non-traded employment, accounting 
for 57 percent of working population in 2001 yet with a similar coefficient, exercises a 
much smaller influence. Every two extra workers boosts working population by just 
under one person, because some non-traded labour comes from the unemployed, the 
traded sector or the public sector. 
 
The model is closed with the identities (A1.7)-(A1.10). Government spending 
(YG) and government employment (EMPG) are treated as exogenous. In the 
unemployment identity ‘employment’ includes self-employment. Equation (A1.10) 
constructs the Welsh cost of living index as a weighted average between traded and 
non-traded regional prices. For simplicity the weights were kept constant over the 
estimating period. 
 
6.  Simulations  
 17 
To assess the impact of the rise in the government spending ratio over the years 
1971-2001, the employment consequences of an income tax reduction compared with 
an equivalent government spending increase are simulated with the estimated model. 
The job effects of a one percent cut in employment tax is also considered. Output is less 
relevant because it includes a substantial government component valued at cost rather 
than market prices.  
 
As the model of section 2 implies, if on average taxpayers in the devolved 
economy regard an increment of government services as more than compensation for 
the private goods foregone, then their demand for imported goods and services will 
diminish, and the economy will expand. The converse is true if they prefer the private 
goods. Measuring the size of the economy by employment, the test of the valuation 
placed on a marginal change of government output is whether the more jobs are created 
by a tax cut than by an equivalent increase in government expenditure. Another way of 
putting the matter is that the valuation measure depends on how the ‘cost per job’ of the 
employment created by the public spending increase compares with the ‘cost per job’ of 
the taxes raised to finance it.  
 
Simulation 1. Income Tax 
Table 3 below presents the quantitative effects of a hypothetical cut in Welsh 
(and UK) tax rates and of a public spending reduction increase corresponding to a one 
percent or 1p in the pound reduction in income tax, in 2001.  
[ insert Table 3 here ] 
A one penny in the pound cut in income tax induces a 0.5 percent (supply side) 
increase in manufacturing output and employment (col. 1). The expansion of the 
manufacturing sector, stemming from a greater labour input, boosts demand for non-
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traded output by 1.6 percent so that total output rises 0.65 percent, while total 
employment increases by 0.54 percent, or some 6,700 jobs. Non-manufacturing 
employment expands by 0.84 percent - or 4,400 jobs. Working population also grows, 
going up by 0.22 percent because of immigration and increasing labour force 
participation. Considering the policy as a job creation exercise, a one penny in the 
pound increase in the after-tax wage in both sectors yields a cost per job of £31,18011. 
 
Simulation 2 - Employment Tax.  
Table 3 (col. 2) shows the effects of a one percent cut in the employment tax rate 
paid by the firm. Since the gross wage for the traded sector is exogenous, an increase in 
the employment tax must be accompanied by a corresponding opposite movement of 
the nominal manufacturing wage rate. Manufacturing employment increases by 0.48 
percent - or 1,760 – triggering an expansion of the manufacturing output. Higher 
activity in the traded sector has a positive impact on non-traded sector output, which 
rises by 0.92 percent. To produce this output, employment in the non-traded sector goes 
up by 0.48 percent - or some 2,500 jobs -  and unemployment falls by 0.23 percent. 
From the point of view of a job creation, the overall cost per extra job is £39,248 in 
revenue forgone 
. 
Simulation 3 - Government  Spending 
  This simulation is based on an increase in government spending approximately 
equal to a one percent increase in income tax, namely a 1.24 percent rise in G. For the 
year 2001 this amounts to £208.9 million. Another direct consequence of the shock is a 
boost to public sector employment, EMPG. For every one percent increase in YG, EMPG 
was assumed to rise according to the historical average, by 0.45 percent.  
                                                                 
11 The figure reported is for the year 2001. For example, for the manufacturing sector the cost is 
£418/week*0.01*52 weeks per employee. For both sectors combined the cost per job is £31,180. 
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The expansion of government spending has no impact on the Welsh 
manufacturing sector (Table 3, col. 3). The direct effect of government spending is 
around 1,570 jobs which, together with the indirect effects, push up the total 
employment to 4,070 jobs. The cost per job per year in this case is around £51,327 and 
the cost per private sector job is much larger. 
 
Comparison of Spending and Tax Simulations 
Overall the costs per job are very high – for the income tax cut about equal to 
the average full time gross wage costs- and especially high for the government spending 
policy. Since the extra jobs generate more tax revenue in all three simulations, there 
would be some offset not considered here. The impact on the non-traded private sector 
is quite powerful and ranges between 0.5% in the government spending simulation to 
0.9% in the employment tax simulation. A vital difference though is that the tax 
reductions expand the traded sector whereas greater government spending has no effect 
on it at all. Unemployment falls when taxes are cut. The unemployment rate also 
declines with greater public spending but only because of the induced growth of 
working population (the denominator of the unemployment ratio). 
 
 The simulation shows that a one penny in the £ cut in Welsh income tax (with a 
corresponding reduction in UK tax) matched by an equivalent cut  in Welsh government 
spending raises employment (and leaves apparent output virtually unchanged). But the 
spillover effects of public spending on the private non-traded sector are relatively weak. 
Consequently the greater part of employment creation in the public spending scenario 
comes from government jobs; the private ‘export’ sector  only expands in a tax cutting 
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scenario and private sector jobs in total are crowded out by balanced tax and spending 
increases.  
 
The inference is that, because of the substantial size of the government sector 
allowed by the net transfers from the central to the devolved economy, at the margin 
Welsh taxpayers do not value an increment of average government spending as highly 
as the private goods forgone because of the corresponding increase in tax payments. A 
tax-cutting strategy would expand the devolved economy. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Devolution of public spending is increasingly seen as an appropriate response to 
heterogeneous political aspirations within current sovereign state boundaries. Tax 
devolution is less widespread because of limited or inappropriate tax bases, adverse 
consequences of tax competition and reduced possibilities for regional stabilisation.  
But against these considerations must be weighed the efficiency/moral hazard case for 
devolving taxes. The political economy of increasing government spending, for instance 
in ‘frontier’ regions with  secessionist challenges, can encourage excessive government 
spending in devolved economies in the sense that  private sector economic activity is 
crowded out and  the possibilities for autonomous economic development unsubsidised 
by central government are reduced. In the case of the United Kingdom’s devolved 
administrations, ‘formula drift’ has prevented reining public spending into line with that 
of the English economy, despite the existence of a rule intended to achieve this end.  
 
The present paper has developed a test for over-expansion of the public sector in 
devolved economies. It turns on whether taxpayers value increases in government 
output at least as highly as the private goods and services they must forgo to finance 
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them. If they do not, they will try to import more private sector goods and services than 
can be financed and thereby create deflationary pressure in the economy, unless more 
central government transfers are provided. When a balanced expansion (contraction) of 
government spending and taxation reduces (increases) employment then the size of the 
public sector is greater than optimal; the valuation of the increment of government 
output is less than that of the matched tax payments. The test can be represented also in 
relative ‘cost per job’ terms. If the implied ‘cost per job’ of government expansion is 
greater than that of the corresponding tax change then the public sector is too large.  
 
Of the three devolved administrations in the United Kingdom,  two of them  
increased their ratios of government spending to GDP relative to the English economy 
over a quarter of a century. The third maintained a ratio 80 percent higher than the 
English over the period. The paper has estimated a three sector Hecksher-Ohlin model 
of the economy with the greatest relative rise of the public spending ratio, Wales. 
Simulation of the model showed a net gain in employment from a one percent cut in 
income tax matched by a corresponding reduction in government spending. The result is 
consistent with the current level of intergovernmental transfers being excessive.  
 22 
References 
Besley T and Coates S. (1999) ‘Centralised Versus Decentralised Provision of 
Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Analysis’ NBER working paper 7084. 
Blanchflower D. G. and Oswald, A.J. (1994) The Wage Curve,  MIT Press. 
Box, G.E.P., Pierce, D. A., (1970). Distribution of residual autocorrelations in 
autoregressive integrated moving average time series models. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 65, pg. 1509-1526. 
Cameron G (2000), ‘Why Did UK Manufacturing Productivity Growth Slow 
Down in the 1970s and Speed Up in the 1980s?’ Economica Feb. 70, 121-41 
Decressin J (2002), ‘Regional Income Redistribution and Risk Sharing: How 
Does Italy Compare in Europe?’ Journal of Public Economics 86 (2002) 287–306. 
Enders, W., Applied Econometric Time Series,  New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
2004. 
Heald D (2003), ‘Funding the Northern Ireland Assembly: Assessing the 
Options’, Research monograph 10 Northern Ireland Development Office. 
Heald, D. (1994), ‘Territorial Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom’, 
Public Administration,  72, Summer, 148-175. 
Hughes Hallett, A. (2005), ‘Political Devolution without Fiscal Devolution’, 
Vanderbilt University, Department of Economics,Working paper 0505. 
Jackman, R. and S. Savouri (1992). ‘Regional Migration versus Regional 
Commuting: The Identification of Housing and Employment Flows’, Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy 39(3), pg. 272-87. 
Journard, I. and P.M. Kongsrud (2003), ‘Fiscal Relations Across Government 
Levels’, OECD Economic Studies 36, 2003/1.  
King D, Pashley M,  and Ball R (2004) ‘An English Assessment of Scotland's 
Education Spending Needs’ Fiscal Studies 25 4 439-467. 
Ljung, G. and Box, G. (1978). "On a Measure of Lack of Fit in Time Series 
Models", Biometrika, 67, 297-303. 
Melitz , J and Zummer F (2002) ‘Regional Redistribution and Stabilization by 
the Center in Canada, France, the UK and the US: A reassessment and new tests’ 
Journal of Public Economics 86  263–286 
Midwinter A (2002) ‘The Limits to Fiscal Autonomy under the Devolution 
Settlement’ Scottish Affairs 41 102-120 
Minford P., Stoney. P, Riley J. and Webb B. (1994). “An Econometric Model of 
Merseyside: Validation and Policy Simulations” Regional Studies,  28,  563-575.  
Obstfeld M and Peri G (1998) Asymmetric Shocks; Regional Non-Adjustment 
and Fiscal Policy, Economic Policy 207-259 
Persson T and Tabellini G (1996) ‘Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing 
and Redistribution’ Journal of Political Economy  October 
Pisauro, Giuseppe, (2001), ‘Intergovernmental Relations and Fiscal Discipline – 
Between Commons and Soft Budget Constraints’, IMF Working Paper 01/65.  
Sanguinetti P and Tommasi M (2004) ‘Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal 
Behaviour: Insurance versus Aggregate Discipline’, Journal of International Economics 
62 149– 170 
Sato M (2002),  ‘Intergovernmental Transfers, Governance Structure and Fiscal 
Decentralization’, Japanese Economic Review  53  1 March  55-76. 
Tiebout, C M. (1956). ‘A Pure Theory of Public Expenditures’, Journal of 
Political Economy 64, 416-424.  
Wildasin D E (2003) ‘Fiscal Competition in Space and Time’, Journal of Public 
Economics 87, pg.  2571– 2588. 
 23 
Appendix 1 
 
Unit Root Tests 
 
Variable # ADF Value for I (1) 
EMPT* -1.730881 
EMPNT* -2.890787 
WPOP* -2.751787 
Real net manufacturing 
wage* 
-2.671702 
Y* -2.199194 
YNT* -2.032721 
YG* -2.77875 
YT* -2.653456 
FWPOP* -1.273380 
EMPG* -2.178411 
SIB* -1.371440 
u_UK** -2.096756 
u_W** -1.905140 
EMP* -2.256045 
G* -1.901133 
LOW** -1.683851 
SEW** -2.010703 
Firms Unit Labour 
Costs*  
-3.445898 
Notes:  
#Unemployment rates, un_W and un_Uk, and the share of female employees in working 
population, FWPOP are in percentages. All other variables are in logs. 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root (intercept and a trend, 2 lags 
included). 
1%   Critical Value* -4.3226 
5%   Critical Value -3.5796 
10% Critical Value -3.2239 
**MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root (only intercept, 2 lags 
included). 
1%   Critical Value** -3.6852 
5%   Critical Value  -2.9705 
10% Critical Value  -2.6242 
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Appendix 2 
Data Sources and Definitions : 
NES   New Earnings Survey 
DWHS1 Digest of Welsh Historical Statistics 1931-1975 
DWHS Digest of Welsh Historical Statistics 1974-1996 
ONS  Office for National Statistics, ONS web site: www.statistics.gov.uk 
DWS   Digest of Welsh Statistics 
RT  Regional Trends 
NAW National Assembly for Wales website , 
http://www.wales.gov.uk/keypubstatisticsforwales/index.htm 
OECD OECD National Accounts, volume 2.  
DWP  Department of Work and Pensions 
MDS  Monthly Digest of Statistics, ONS 
ODPM  Office of the Deputy Prime Minister website, www.odpm.gov.uk 
 
Definitions: 
Manufacturing wages (WMAN) – £/week. This is “average weekly earnings, full time 
manual and non-manual male”. For the 1986-2001 period the data is from NES. For the 
1971-1985 period no such series is available. However, the NES reports separate time 
series for manual and non-manual male weekly earnings so that we re-constructed the 
series by assuming a constant share of manual males in total male employment of 0.7. 
This ratio was obtained (approximated) for year 1990 from Table 8.2, pg 159 in DWHS. 
To get the real wage the series was deflated by the CPI. 
CPI –UK consumer price index ONS, (1990=100). 
GDP deflator (GDPD) – ONS, (1990=100) 
Price of UK manufactures output (PM) – ONS, 1990=100. 
Working population (WPOP) – Thousands. Data for 1974-1996 from DWHS, Table 
7.2, pg 137.  
Manufacturing, total employment (EMPT) – Thousands. Data for 2000 and 2001 was 
taken from the NAW. For other periods data is from RT. 
Total employment (EMP) – RT. Thousands.  
Welsh Output (Y) – £ millions, GDP at factor cost, current prices. Data from 1999 to 
2001 are estimates and was taken from NAW. Data from 1974-1996 is from DWHS, 
Table 2.1, pg. 25. 
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Manufacturing Output (YMAN) - £ Millions. For the 1971-1990 period data is from 
RT (it has been multiplied by a coefficient of 1.075 for consistency because from 1996 
the series has been revised backwards to 1989 by the Welsh Assembly Government to 
reflect the new European System of Accounts 1995 requirements, ESA95). For the 
1989-1997 period it is from DWS 1999 issue, pg. 231. The 1998-2001 data from the 
NAW.  
Employment tax rate borne by the firm (taxfirm) – Percentage. To get an 
approximation for this we took the ratio of two indexes, namely total labour costs per 
unit of output divided by wages and salaries per unit of output (for the UK, whole 
economy). The latter is series LNNK and the former is series LNNL, both are from the 
ONS web site. Alternatively unit wage costs for the 1960-2001 period are in Table 3.8 
in the Economic Trends Annual Supplement 2002.  
Income tax (taxinc) – Percentage. This has been computed as (DT+SS)/HCR where 
DT is direct taxes on household income, SS is the household’s contribution to social 
security schemes, and HCR is households’ current receipts minus employer 
contributions to social security schemes. All three time series were taken from the 
OECD National Accounts, vol 2.  
Ratio of females in employment (FWPOP) – Percentages. The female employees in 
employment series (which does not include the self-employed) obtained from RT was 
divided by the WPOP and multiplied by 100.     
Ratio of house prices Wales/South East (HP) –  ODPM. 
Public sector employment (EMPPS) – Thousands. This is from DWHS, Table 7.3, pg 
139 for the 1974-1996 period. To get a consistent time series we added employment 
from ‘other services’ to ‘public administration, education, and health’ for the 1974-1980 
period. For the 1971-1973 period we assumed that public sector employment follows 
the same trend with public sector data. This is published in the row 27 in the table 
reporting data on insured employees from the WDHS1. Data for the 1997-2001 period 
was taken from various issues of DWS.  
Sickness and invalidity benefits (SIB) – Thousands. For the 1978-2001 period data is 
from DWP (e-mail). For the period prior to 1978 we used the data from RT. The table 
'Sickness and Invalidity benefit: days of certified incapacity in period' in RT reports 
Wales data on both males and females. The time series was extended backwards for the 
period 1971-1978 by assuming that the 1982 ratio of the number of people who 
received SB to the number of days (i.e. 116/36.3) remained unchanged over the period. 
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An alternative way would be to take a fraction of the number of people who received 
SB in the UK during that period. 
Population (POP) – RT and DWHS, Thousands.  
Unemployment Benefits (UB) – In real terms, from the Liverpool model data file. 
Welsh Government Consumption (YG) - £ Millions. Obtained by multiplying the 
public sector average yearly wage by the number of public sector employees.  
Welsh Government Total Spending (G) -   1982-1996  DWHS (p.36).  After 1996 
various editions of DWS (DWS 1999, p.232 and DWS 2001, p.28). Public spending 
data for Wales was in considerable disarray in the 1970s and no consistent series could 
be found.  Prior to 1982, G data is therefore constructed assuming that the Welsh 
government spending is a constant fraction of the total UK government spending. 
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 Appendix 3.  
The Ljung-Box Q-statistics for the residuals for model equations 
 
The choice of Ljung-Box Q-statistics (Ljung and Box, 1978) is motivated by the 
fact that this test yields superior small sample performance compared to the original 
Box and Pierce (1970) Q-statistics. Following Enders (2003), who suggests that the 
number of sample autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations should not be higher 
than T/4, for our 30 dataset sample we set this to 6. The results are presented below. 
 
The Ljung-Box Q-statistics for the residuals for model equations 
Eq. A1.1 Eq. A1.2 Eq. A1.3 Eq. A1.4 Eq. A1.5 Eq. A1.6 
0.01 2.02 3.16* 0.05 1.27 0.06 
4.94* 2.13 3.36 1.47 1.27 0.42 
4.94 6.10 3.89 1.73 1.27 2.45 
5.59 7.27 6.18 2.36 6.22 2.79 
7.86 7.50 9.88* 3.51 11.02* 3.01 
10.27 8.44 11.85* 3.79 11.02* 3.12 
    * Significant at 10% level. 
 
The calculated values of Q in Table 4 do not exceed the appropiate 5% values in the 
chi-squared table so the null of no significant autocorrelation cannot be rejected at this 
level of significance. 
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Figure 1. Intergovernmental transfers and state employment 
 
 
 
Table 1. Regional UK public expenditure to GDP as a ratio of England’s public 
expenditure to GDP, 1976-2001 
 
Source:  Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis (PESA) HM Treasury, various issues (PESA 1998-1999 
Tables 7.2B, 7.3B, 7.4B, 7.5B and 7.6B; PESA 2002-2003 Tables 8.3B and 8.4B, PESA 2004-2005 Table 
8.1). The 1976 figure has been calculated by multiply ing the ratio of devolved spending per head (taken 
from Table 3, HM Treasury, 1979) by the GDP per capita ratio (England relative to region).   
 
 
Year Scotland Wales Northern 
Ireland 
North East 
England 
1976 1.27 1.20 1.88 n/a 
1992 1.24 1.46 1.83 n/a 
1997 1.27 1.49 1.78 n/a 
2001 1.34 1.51 1.80 1.56 
Aggregate private 
sector supply  
Real exchange 
rate =(w/P)k 
Private sector  
output 
HOS  equilibrium 
value =f(MPL)=e** 
Primary current 
account balance 
Inter-govt 
transfers and 
imports Private sector 
output Demand 
for output 
Private 
supply when 
government 
uses more 
local labour 
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Table 2: Estimated Model Equations 
A1.1 [ ] FWPOPBENRPITWTIMEEMP WYTT *085.0)log(*54.0/)1(*log*54.0*05.028.101)log(
)42.6()36.2()23.10()28.11(
+--+-=
-
 
A1.2 [ ] [ ] )(*036.0/)1(*log*94.0)log()/log(*88.0)log(16.0)/log(
)60.2()31.2(1)81.6()34.0(
FWPOPPTWEMPPYEMPPY MEMPTTMTTMT
--
-++-++=  
A1.3 )/log(73.0]/)1(log[48.0]/)1)(1(log[80.071.0)/log(
)78.2(
1
)71.1(
1
)28.7()67.0(
MNTMYTWEMPYWNT PPPTYRPITTGRPIY
-
--
-
--+--+-=  
A1.4 [ ] 1
)24.2()31.2()31.2(
)log(*48.0)/log(*52.0/)1(*log*48.057.1)log( -
-
+++-= NTNTNTNTEMPNTNT EMPPYPTWEMP  
A1.5 )/log(*053.0)/log(15.0)/log(
)01.2()31.1(
WWTWNT RPIGRPIWRPIW ++-=
-
 
A1.6 )log(*258.0_*003.0)log(*106.0)log(*087.0)log(037.0)log(*259.0154.4)log(
)85.6()29.4()15.2()32.2()08.3()69.6()81.20(
GNT EMPUKuSEWLOWSIBEMPWPOP +++--+=
--
 
A1.7 GNTT YYYY ++=  
A1.8 GNTT EMPEMPEMPEMP ++=  
A1.9 [ ] 100*/1_ WPOPEMPWu -=  
A1.10 MNTW PPRPI *25.0*75.0 +=  
 (t – statistics in parentheses) 
Y – Welsh output (billions £) 
YNT – Welsh non-manufacturing output (billions £) 
YT – Welsh manufacturing output (billions £) 
YG – Welsh government spending (billions £) 
G  – Welsh government spending, including transfer 
payments (billions £) 
EMP – Welsh Employment (thousands) 
EMPT – Welsh manufacturing employment (thousands) 
EMPNT – Welsh non-manufacturing employment (ths.)  
EMPG – Welsh public sector employment (thousands) 
u_UK – UK unemployment rate (%) 
u_W – Welsh unemployment rate (%) 
WT – Welsh manufacturing wage (£, weekly, gross) 
WUK – Average UK wage (£, gross, weekly) 
WNT – Non-traded Welsh wage (£, gross, weekly) 
TY – Welsh employees’ income tax 
TEMP  – Welsh employers’ income tax 
TYUK – UK income tax  
BEN – Unemployment benefits  
FWPOP – Welsh ratio of females in working population 
SIB – Welsh claimants of sickness benefits (thousands) 
LOW – London-Wales relative house prices 
SEW – South-East – Wales relative house prices 
WPOP = Welsh working population (thousands) 
PM – Manufactures prices (1990=100) 
PNT – Welsh non-treaded price index (1990=100) 
RPI – UK Retail Price Index (1990=100) 
RPIW – Welsh Cost of Living Index (1990=100) 
Equation number DW R squared 
A1.1 2.00 0.90 
A1.2 2.45 0.97 
A1.3 1.17 0.69 
A1.4 2.00 0.85 
A1.5 1.60 0.12 
A1.6 2.00 0.97 
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Table 3. Impact of Hypothetical Reductions of Devolved Taxes and Increases in  
Public Spending (differences from the base run) 
 
 (1) -1p in £ Income 
tax 
(2) -1% Employment 
tax (and fall in 
manufacturing 
wage)* 
(3) +1.24% Government 
spending 
GDP +0.65% +0.42% +0.68% 
Manufacturing 
output  
+0.63 % +0.48 % - 
Public sector 
output 
- - +1.24% 
Non-
Manufacturing 
output 
+1.60% +0.92% +0.99% 
Employment +0.54 % 
(6,700) 
+0.34 % 
(4,260) 
+0.33% 
(4,070) 
Non-
Manufacturing 
Employment 
+0.84 % 
(4,400) 
+0.48 % 
(2,500) 
+0.48% 
(2,500) 
Manufacturing 
employment  
+0.63 % 
(2,300) 
+0.48 % 
(1,760) 
- 
Public sector 
employment 
- - +0.44% 
(1,570) 
Working 
population 
+0.22 % +0.12 % +0.24% 
Unemployment 
rate 
-0.33 % -0.23 % -0.09% 
Source: Simulations of the model of Table 3. 
Notes: Nu mber of jobs in parentheses - the estimates are for the year 2001 
* The yield of the one percent cut in employment tax is less than that of the one percent income 
tax. 
 
 
